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A young child has little choice but to repose his or her
trust with a parent or parental figure. When such a
person abuses that trust, he commits two wrongs, the first
by sexually abusing the child, the second by using the
child’s dependency and innocence to prevent recognition
or revelation of the abuse. This may be accomplished by
enforcing secrecy around the acts or even by teaching the
child that the
sexual acts are normal or necessary to the
1
relationship.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last six months an unthinkable child sexual abuse
scandal has unfolded. Numerous courageous people have come
forward to confront the painful issue of their sexual abuse by a
clergy member when they were children. Tragically, we have
learned that some of the abuse could have been prevented if
church officials had responded appropriately to their knowledge of
certain priests’ dangerous propensities toward children. The
scandal has helped raise awareness of the prevalence and damaging
effects of childhood sexual abuse. However, in many states, the law
remains inadequate to address the issue or is applied incorrectly.
This comment begins by discussing the life-shattering damage
that child sexual abuse has on victims. Next, it discusses the history
of the delayed discovery rule and in particular its history in
2
Minnesota. Further, this comment examines the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s recent application of the delayed discovery statute
3
in D.M.S. v. Barber, where the court approved its previous disregard
of the clear language of the delayed discovery statute in Blackowiak
4
v. Kemp and also pronounced a new rule that the delayed discovery
5
statute does not begin to run until age eighteen. Finally, this

1. Evans v. Eckelman, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605, 609 (Ct. App. 1990).
2. Delayed discovery is a doctrine stating that a statute of limitations does
not begin to run when the victim is injured, as most statutes of limitations do, but
at the discovery of some event.
3. 645 N.W.2d 383, 389-90 (Minn. 2002).
4. 546 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 1996).
5. See D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 390.
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comment briefly examines how courts from states other than
Minnesota have correctly applied delayed discovery statutes, and
the recent recognition by both the Connecticut and California
legislatures that childhood sexual abuse is a uniquely damaging
and heinous crime.
II. CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE
A. Prevalence
Approximately twenty percent of Americans have been
6
sexually abused as children. This means almost sixty million living
7
Americans are child molestation victims.
B. Secrecy
Childhood sexual abuse may be one of the most under8
reported crimes in the United States. Under-reporting is so
9
prevalent that virtually every state, including Minnesota, has
enacted a mandatory reporting statute that makes it a crime for
certain people associated with children to not report suspected
10
child abuse to the proper authorities.
There are numerous reasons for the under-reporting of
11
childhood sexual abuse. Almost all childhood sexual abuse instills
6. M EI LING REIN, CHILD ABUSE BETRAYING A TRUST 64-65 (John F. McCoy et
al. eds., 2001) (citing a December 1995 Gallup Poll Monthly which asked 1,000
adults if “before the age of eighteen were you personally ever touched in a sexual
way, or ever forced to touch an adult or older child in a sexual way); see also
William Holmes, Sexual Abuse of Boys: Definition, Prevalence, Correlates, Sequelae, and
Management, 281 JAMA 1855, 1855-62 at
http://jama.ama-assn.org/issues/v280n21/rfull/jrv80046.html#a2 (last visited
Feb. 7, 2003)(examining 149 previous studies of male sexual abuse and
concluding that one in five boys had been abused).
7. U.S. Census Bureau Homepage, at
http://www.census.gov/main/www/popclock.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2003)
(using current estimate of U.S. population).
8. M ARGARET O. HYDE & ELIZABETH H. FORSYTH, M.D., THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF
CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 10 (1997).
9. M INN. STAT. § 626.556, subd. 3(a) (2001).
10. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL
CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT INFORMATION, CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT
STATE
STATUTE
SERIES:
COMPENDIUM
OF
LAWS,
at
http://www.calib.com/nccanch/pubs/stats02/mandrep.cfm (last visited Feb. 7,
2003).
11. See DALE ROBERT REINERT, SEXUAL ABUSE AND INCEST 34-38 (1997).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 4 [2003], Art. 4
FINNEGAN_F ORMATTED . DOC

1448

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

4/7/2003 11:09 AM

[Vol. 29:4

confusion, guilt, and shame in victims, which makes them feel that
they are somehow at fault for the abuse or that it was not abuse at
12
all. Often, abusers tell their victims to keep the “relationship”
13
secret. Other times, the adult abuser manipulates the child victim
to think that the relationship is built on mutual love for one
14
another, rendering the victim powerless to report the abuse. A
young child who is sexually abused often lacks the verbal ability to
15
adequately convey what occurred. Sometimes the abusers go so
16
far as to explicitly or implicitly threaten the victims. The threat
could be harm to the victim, harm to the victim’s family or friends,
or even some twisted form of retribution by a higher power, e.g.,
17
going to hell. Even in the absence of a threat, adolescents who do
find the courage to tell someone about the abuse often find that
18
the listener is horrified, disgusted, or even in disbelief. All of
these consequences and realities of childhood sexual abuse lead to
its significant under-reporting.
C. Effects
Some of the effects of sexual abuse do not become
apparent until the victim is an adult and a major life
event, such as marriage or birth of a child, takes place.
Therefore, a child who seemed unharmed by childhood
abuse can develop crippling symptoms years later and can
have a difficult
time connecting his adulthood problems
19
with his past.
20
The effects of childhood sexual abuse are numerous. They
are not only immediately experienced by many survivors in
different ways, but often later manifest themselves in a variety of

12. See M IC HUNTER, ABUSED BOYS 80-82 (1991).
13. REINERT, supra note 11, at 34-35.
14. M AXINE HANCOCK & KAREN BURTON M AINS, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: HOPE
FOR HEALING 33 (1987) (citing Mary Ellen Siemers, Treatment Methods for Adult
Female Survivors of Incest: A Review of The Literature 11-13 (1986) (unpublished
master’s thesis, University of Wisconsin)).
15. HYDE & FORSYTH, supra note 8, at 10.
16. HANCOCK & MAINS, supra note 14, at 33.
17. REINERT, supra note 11, at 35 (noting that abusers use all types of threats
to keep the abuse secret).
18. HANCOCK & MAINS, supra note 14, at 33.
19. HUNTER, supra note 12, at 59.
20. See e.g., SUSAN M UFSON, C.S.W., & RACHAEL KRANZ, STRAIGHT TALK ABOUT
CHILD ABUSE 74-75 (1991).
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21

forms.
Possible effects include lowered self-esteem, suicidal
impulses, feelings of shame and guilt, aggression, eating disorders,
running away, distrust of authority and authority figures, tendency
to be involved with abusive relationships, offender behavior, feeling
hopeless or helpless, difficulty in forming trusting, intimate
22
relationships, depression and post-traumatic stress disorder.
Survivors of sexual abuse often develop defenses, such as
denial, disassociation, and memory repression to deal with ongoing
23
or past sexual abuse. “Because . . . defenses operate mostly on an
unconscious level, . . . [survivors of sexual abuse] will probably
24
remain unaware of them.” While these defenses operate to shield
survivors of sexual abuse from the pain of the past, they
unfortunately hinder the ability of a survivor to live a full and
25
happy life. Further, these defenses make it almost impossible for
victims of sexual abuse to connect the damage and turmoil in their
26
lives with the sexual abuse that they suffered as children.
D. Childhood Sexual Abuse By Clergy
There has not yet been any comprehensive study to examine
27
the prevalence of childhood sexual abuse by clergy. However, it is
estimated that about six percent of all U.S. Catholic clergy have
28
engaged in sexual activity with a minor. There are approximately
21.
22.

See generally REINERT, supra note 11, at 36-37.
See generally WAYNE KRITSBERG, THE INVISIBLE WOUND: A NEW APPROACH TO
HEALING CHILDHOOD SEXUAL TRAUMA 56-57 (1993) (listing secondary effects of
sexual abuse); M UFSON, supra note 20, at 74-75 (listing various effects of sexual
abuse); REIN, supra note 6, at 71-72 (discussing various studies which examined
effects of childhood sexual abuse); REINERT, supra note 11, at 36-37 (listing signs of
sexual abuse).
23. KRITSBERG, supra note 22, at 56-57 (describing memory repression as the
memory loss of the abuse as a result of the overwhelming emotional state during
the abuse; describing disassociation as feeling disconnected or numb when
recalling the abuse; describing denial as minimization or complete unacknowledgement of logic or actual memories of abuse).
24. Id. at 48.
25. Id.
26. See HUNTER, supra note 12, at 59-60.
27. Alan Cooperman, Does Catholic Church Have Greater Problem With Sexual
Abuse than Other Religions?, WASH. POST, March 16, 2002, at
http://www.detnews.com/2002/religion/0203/24/religion-441972.htm
(last
visited Feb. 7, 2003). In the article, Rev. Rossetti stated “[y]ou can’t take [a sample
of] 1,200 males and ask them, ‘[h]ow many of you have committed child abuse?’
and expect to get a true answer.” Id.
28. Marilyn Elias, Is Homosexuality to Blame for the Church Scandal?, U.S.A.
TODAY, July, 15, 2002, at http://www.usatoday.com/news/2002-07-15-church-
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60,000 active and inactive Catholic priests and brothers in the
31
United States today. This estimate indicates that approximately
3,000 to 4,000 priests and brothers have engaged in sexual activity
32
with a minor. This is a staggering number, especially when viewed
in light of the fact that most child molesters prey on numerous
33
victims.
A survivor of sexual abuse by a clergy member may suffer
effects beyond those discussed above. Priests are highly respected
authority figures, particularly among Catholic families. Survivors
may experience a deeper lack of respect for authority as a result of
the abuse by a clergy member. They may also experience a lack of
faith and religious belief. Finally, many survivors of sexual abuse by
priests are just now learning that often church officials, aware of
some priests’ abusive propensities, could have prevented the abuse.
The realization of this betrayal causes additional harm and injury to
those survivors.
III. THE DELAYED DISCOVERY RULE
A. History
The United States Supreme Court first applied the delayed
34
discovery rule in Urie v. Thompson. In Urie, a railroad worker
alleged that he had inhaled silica dust and as a result suffered
35
injuries that were manifested years later. Had the Court decided
that the statute of limitations started to run when the railroad
36
worker first inhaled the dust, his claims would have been barred.
The Court stated, “[w]e do not think the humane legislative plan

gay_x.htm (citing a study done by A.W. Richard Sipe, psychotherapist and expriest, who has done what’s believed to be the longest-term, largest study on
priests’ sexuality, following 1,000 priests for up to twenty-five years).
29. A priest is a clergyman or minister authorized to carry out the Christian
ministry. AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 961 (1963).
30. A brother is a man who devotes himself to the duties of a religious order.
Id. at 153.
31. See generally Elias, supra note 28.
32. See Tom Economus, Catholic Pedophile Priests: The Effects on U.S. Society, at
http://www.thelinkup.com/stats.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2003).
33. See REINERT, supra note 11, at 22 (stating that perpetrators often affect
many children in the perpetrator’s life).
34. 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
35. See id. at 165-66.
36. See id. at 169.
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37

intended such consequences to attach to blameless ignorance.”
The Court concluded that “the afflicted employee can be held to
be ‘injured’ only when the accumulated effects of the deleterious
38
substance manifest themselves.”
In the late 1980s and early 1990s a movement to raise
awareness about the prevalence of sexual abuse swept the nation
and brought about discussion of the applicability of the delayed
discovery rule to cases of sexual abuse. Many states reacted by
enacting some type of delayed discovery statute for claims
39
specifically based upon sexual abuse.
These statutes have
generally gone beyond the “manifestation” test articulated in Urie,
and have recognized that even if injuries are present, sex abuse
victims have a difficult time connecting the perpetrator’s wrongful
40
conduct as the cause of their psychological injury.
B. Minnesota Delayed Discovery Statute
41

The Minnesota delayed discovery statute was enacted in 1989.
It states, in pertinent part, that “an action for damages based on
personal injury caused by sexual abuse must be commenced within
six years of the time the plaintiff knew or had reason to know that
42
the injury was caused by the sexual abuse.” The statute also states:
“[t]his section does not affect the suspension of the statute of
43
limitations during a period of disability under section 541.15.”
Finally, the statute states that it applies both to the person who
37. Id. at 170.
38. Id.
39. Anne Greenwood Brown, Sometimes the Bad Guy Wins: Minnesota’s Delayed
Discovery Rule, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 401, 413 (1997) (citation omitted); see also
infra, notes 225-30, discussing other states’ treatment of the statute of limitations
for claims based on childhood sexual abuse.
40. See generally infra, notes 225-30.
41. 1989 Minn. Laws, ch. 190, § 2 (codified as amended at M INN. STAT. §
541.073 (2002)).
42. M INN. STAT. § 541.073 subd. 2 (2002). Originally, the statute provided for
a two-year statute of limitations for claims based upon intentional acts and six
years for claims based upon negligent acts. See M INN. STAT. § 541.073 (1990),
amended by Act of May 28, 1991, ch. 232, § 1, 1991 Minn. Laws 629, 629. In 1991,
the legislature erased the distinction between claims based upon intentional acts
and claims based upon negligent acts, making both subject to a six-year statute of
limitations. See Act of May 28, 1991, ch. 232, § 1, 1991 Minn. Laws 629, 629
(codified at M INN. STAT. § 541.073, subd. 2 (1992)).
43. Id. at subd. 2(d). The disability statute serves to prevent an applicable
statute of limitations from running when a victim is under a disability such as
minority or insanity. See M INN. STAT. § 541.045 (2002).
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committed the abuse and the person(s) who negligently permit the
44
sexual abuse to occur.
C. Statutory Analysis of the Minnesota Delayed Discovery Statute
The role of the court in statutory analysis is to discover and
45
effectuate the legislature’s intent. The Minnesota Supreme Court
concluded that “where the legislature’s intent is clearly discernable
from the plain and unambiguous language [of a statute], statutory
46
construction is neither necessary nor permitted.” Words and
47
phrases are to be interpreted according to their plain meaning.
Further, it is a basic maxim of statutory construction that “a statute
is to be construed, if possible, so that no word, phrase, or sentence
48
is superfluous, void, or insignificant.”
In interpreting the delayed discovery statute, the first question
49
is the meaning of “knew or had reason to know.” This generally
requires an objective examination of what a reasonable person
50
would have known in the plaintiff’s circumstances. Hence, the
standard is what a reasonable person who was sexually abused when
51
he or she was a child would have known. This examination is a
52
question of fact for the jury. After determining that the inquiry is
objective, the next question is what must the victim know or have
reason to know. The statute clearly states that a victim must know
or have reason to know 1) that he or she was abused, 2) that he or
she was injured, and 3) that the injury was caused by the sexual
53
abuse.
If the victim does not have knowledge of all three
54
elements, the statute clearly should not begin to run. Obviously,

44. Id. at subd. 3.
45. Lino Lakes Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Reiling, 610 N.W.2d 355, 357 (Minn.
2000) (interpreting zoning statutes).
46. Am. Tower, L.P., v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn. 2001)
(quoting Ed Herman & Sons v. Russell, 535 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Minn. 1995)); see
also M INN. STAT. § 645.16 (2000).
47. Am. Tower, 636 N.W.2d at 806.
48. Duluth Fireman’s Relief Ass’n v. Duluth, 361 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn.
1985).
49. M INN. STAT. § 541.073 subd. 2.
50. Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3; W.J.L. v. Bugge, 573 N.W.2d 677, 680 (Minn.
1998) (stating that “application of a reasonable person standard” is necessary).
51. See Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3.
52. Bugge, 573 N.W.2d at 680; Bertram v. Poole, 597 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1999).
53. See M INN. STAT. § 541.073.
54. See id.
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if the legislature intended the statute to run at the time the victim
knew of any of the three elements individually, then it would not
55
have required discovery of all three in the statute.
IV. THE MINNESOTA COURTS’ APPLICATION OF THE
DELAYED DISCOVERY STATUTE
A. History
The Minnesota Supreme Court first interpreted the delayed
56
discovery statute in 1996 in Blackowiak v. Kemp. Blackowiak
alleged that he was sexually abused by Kemp, his school
57
counselor. The allegations stemmed from incidents that took
place when Blackowiak was eleven years old, twenty-two years
58
before suit was commenced. Blackowiak testified that as an adult
he did not tell his counselor about the sexual abuse because he was
59
ashamed of it. Furthermore, Blackowiak testified that at age
twenty-two he “freaked out” when he encountered Kemp (the
60
perpetrator) accompanying a young boy. However, Blackowiak
testified that at that time he still did not even acknowledge to
61
himself that Kemp had sexually abused him. Blackowiak also
testified that until 1991, a year before bringing suit, he never
62
thought about the abuse and didn’t want to think about it.
The court held that Blackowiak’s claims were barred by the sixyear statute of limitations in the delayed discovery statute because
the evidence “overwhelmingly demonstrate[d] that he knew of the
sexual abuse long prior to 1986 [more than six years before
63
commencing suit].” The court based its decision on the fact that

55. Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 4 (Gardebring, J., dissenting) (laying out the
three elements of the delayed discovery statute).
56. 546 N.W.2d 1.
57. Id. at 2. Blackowiak alleged that on one occasion at Kemp’s cabin, Kemp
forced him to have oral and anal intercourse with him. Id. Blackowiak further
alleged that he believed there were other incidents of abuse, but because he
suffered from traumatic amnesia, he could not remember any of them. Id. at 2.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. Blackowiak stated that he freaked out because he assumed that Kemp
was sexually abusing the young boy. Id.
61. Blackowiak, 528 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
62. Id.
63. Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3.
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64

Blackowiak felt shame about the abuse and because Blackowiak
freaked out upon seeing Kemp with a young boy, even though
there was evidence that Blackowiak did not acknowledge that Kemp
65
abused him until 1991. The court stated that “as a matter of law,
one is ‘injured’ if one is sexually abused,” based upon the
observation that in liability insurance disputes criminal sexual
conduct is such that an intention to inflict injury can be inferred as
66
a matter of law. The court concluded that the ultimate question
then under the delayed discovery statute was not the “manifestation
and form of the injury [which] is significant to the victim,” but
rather “the time at which the complainant knew or should have
67
known that he/she was sexually abused.”
Two years after Blackowiak, the Minnesota Supreme Court
again had the opportunity to interpret the delayed discovery statute
68
in W.J.L. v. Bugge. At age thirty-three, W.J.L. brought suit alleging
that Bugge, one of her female high school teachers, sexually
69
abused her. According to W.J.L., the alleged abuse began more
70
than fifteen years earlier while W.J.L. was a junior in high school.
W.J.L. stated that Bugge repeatedly told W.J.L. that she (W.J.L.)
71
“was a lesbian and that their relationship was therapeutic.” W.J.L.
recalled being confused by the relationship, but did not realize that
72
it was sexual abuse at the time. Further, W.J.L. testified that it was
not until 1992 (less than six years from commencement of the
suit), when she read the book The Prince of Tides, which referenced
same-sex rape, that she realized that she had been sexually
73
abused. Finally, expert testimony on W.J.L.’s behalf showed that a
64. Shame is an emotion of self-blame. It would seem too obvious to note
that a victim who feels “shame” about an assault has not discovered that it was the
perpetrator rather than the victim who engaged in wrongful or tortuous conduct.
Thus, feelings of “shame” are not evidence that the plaintiff discovered that
he/she was sexually abused.
65. See Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3.
66. Id. (citing Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Hill, 314 N.W.2d 834, 835 (Minn.
1982)). The court concluded that “concepts of sexual abuse and injury within the
meaning of this statute are essentially one and the same, not separable.” Id.
67. Id.
68. 573 N.W.2d 677, 681-82 (Minn. 1998).
69. W.J.L. v. Bugge, No. C6-96-1619, 1997 WL 30721, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App.
Jan. 28, 1997) (W.J.L. commenced suit on February 2, 1995).
70. See Bugge, 573 N.W.2d. at 678-79. W.J.L. was approximately sixteen years
and eleven months old when the abuse began in 1978. Id. at 679.
71. Id. at 679.
72. Id. at 682.
73. Id. at 679.
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reasonable person in W.J.L.’s circumstances would not have known
74
that she was sexually abused until 1992. Reaffirming Blackowiak’s
holding that “one is injured if one is sexually abused,” the Bugge
court held that W.J.L.’s claims were time barred on W.J.L.’s twenty75
fifth birthday. Even though W.J.L. offered evidence showing that
she did not recognize the nature of the abuse, that she did not
recognize the extent of the injury, and that a reasonable person in
W.J.L.’s situation would not know that he or she was sexually
abused until 1992, the court concluded that W.J.L. “failed to
present specific facts giving rise to a genuine issue of material
76
fact.”
77
Justice Gardebring dissented in both Blackowiak and Bugge,
reasoning that the plain meaning of the delayed discovery statute
“demonstrates that it is knowledge of causation which triggers the
6-year limitation period, not merely knowledge that sexual abuse
78
occurred.”
Further, Justice Gardebring noted that the clear
legislative intent behind the delayed discovery statute was to
provide those abused as children additional time to become aware
of the link between the abuse and the emotional injuries, which
79
often occurs much later in life.
B. Post Bugge Decisions
Not surprisingly, in the wake of Blackowiak and Bugge, lower
courts have had difficulty applying the clear language of the
delayed discovery statute in conjunction with the supreme court
80
precedent.
Shortly after Bugge, the court of appeals had an
81
opportunity to apply the statute in J.J. v. Luckow. In J.J., the

74. Id. at 682.
75. Id. at 681-82.
The court held that under M INN. STAT. §
541.15(a)(1)(2000) the six-year statute of limitations in M INN. STAT. § 541.073
does not begin to run until one year after the plaintiff reaches the age of majority.
Id.
76. Id. at 682.
77. Bugge, 573 N.W.2d at 682-84; Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3-4. Justice Blatz
joined in the Bugge dissent. 573 N.W.2d at 684.
78. Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 4.
79. Id.
80. See e.g., Doe 28B v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis, No. C9-992164, 2000 WL 781362, at *2-4 (Minn. Ct. App. June 20, 2000); Brett v. Watts, 601
N.W.2d 199, 203-04 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999); Bertram, 597 N.W.2d at 312-16; J.J. v.
Luckow, 578 N.W.2d 17, 19-21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
81. 578 N.W.2d at 19-21.
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plaintiff alleged that he was sexually abused by a police officer.
The plaintiff commenced his action when he was twenty-four years
83
old. Instead of using the age twenty-five rule applied in Bugge, the
J.J. court construed the delayed discovery statute to give a survivor
of childhood sexual abuse six years from the age of majority to
84
bring any claims based upon the alleged abuse. As a result, the
court held that the plaintiff’s claims were barred because he failed
85
to commence his action before his twenty-fourth birthday.
A little over a year after J.J., the court of appeals again
86
confronted the delayed discovery statute in Bertram v. Poole. In
Bertram, two sisters, Katie and Jeannette, alleged that their uncle
87
abused them when they were children. At the commencement of
88
the suit, Katie was twenty-four and Jeannette was twenty-five.
Basing its decision on Bugge, a different panel of judges from that
in J.J. concluded that a survivor of sexual abuse has until age
twenty-five, not twenty-four, to bring a claim based upon that
89
abuse.
Accordingly, the court held that based solely on the
delayed discovery statute, absent anything else, Katie’s claims would
90
be timely, whereas Jeannette’s claims would be barred. Bertram
also held that memory repression in the case of childhood sexual
abuse tolls the statute of limitations until the victim remembers the
91
abuse.
As a result, the court remanded the case for “the
determination of whether . . . Katie and Jeannette suffered from
92
memory repression.”
Subsequent to Bertram, the court of appeals decided Brett v.

82. Id. at 18-19.
83. Id. at 18.
84. Id. The court concluded that no construction of the delayed discovery
statute in the current case without adding the year addition of the infancy statute
would allow the plaintiff’s claim to stand. Id. The court then concluded that the
plaintiff’s cause of action was barred on his twenty-fourth birthday, more than a
month before he commenced his suit. Id.
85. Id.
86. 597 N.W.2d at 309-16.
87. Id. at 311. One of the sisters alleged that she became pregnant twice and
twice her uncle, a doctor, aborted the pregnancies. Id.
88. Id. at 314.
89. Id. at 313-14. Judge Foley dissented and argued that the reference in the
delayed discovery statute to the disability statute only gives a survivor of sexual
abuse until age nineteen to bring a claim. Id. at 314-16.
90. Id. at 314.
91. Id. at 312.
92. Id. at 314.
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93

Watts. In Brett, Melissa Brett suffered injuries from being hit in
the head by a softball. Melissa’s doctor sexually abused her from
94
the time she was sixteen years old until she was twenty-one.
Under the guise of examination and treatment, the doctor made
Melissa close her eyes and jump up and down on one leg, while
only wearing her underwear, ran a pinwheel over the woman’s legs
and breasts, touched her breasts, and stayed in the room while she
95
was undressing and dressing. The abusive nature of the conduct
was unbeknownst to Melissa until she discovered that the doctor
96
was doing similar things to other women. Suit was commenced
97
after Melissa turned twenty-four years old. The court did not even
address the issue of whether Melissa’s claims were barred by the sixyear delayed discovery statute of limitations and allowed her claim
98
to proceed on the merits. It is unclear whether the court applied
the Bugge standard, or instead determined that the statute of
limitations did not begin to run until Melissa knew that she had
99
been abused.
The court of appeals again reviewed the delayed discovery
statute a year after Brett in Doe 28B v. Archdiocese of St. Paul &
100
Minneapolis. Doe 28B involved two men, John Doe 28B and John
Doe 28A, who alleged that they had been abused as boys by two
101
clergymen, one being Father Ronan Liles. The record showed
John Doe 28A first recognized and started having nightmares about
102
the abuse in 1991.
He also stated that as time went on the
nightmares became more detailed and at one point the face of
103
Father Liles came into his nightmare. The record also showed
that John Doe 28B wrote a letter to Father Liles in 1994 that stated
he was having bad dreams for years, lied to his wife about the
104
dreams, and tried to forget about the abuse.
The court concluded that the plaintiffs “were always seriously
93. 601 N.W.2d 199, 199-204 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
94. Id. at 200.
95. Id. at 200-01.
96. Id. at 201.
97. Id. at 200.
98. See id. at 199-200. It is also possible that this defense was never raised and
therefore was not before the court of appeals.
99. See id.
100. No. C9-99-2164, 2000 WL 781362, at *1-4 (Minn. Ct. App. June 20, 2000).
101. Id. at *1.
102. Id. at *2.
103. Id.
104. Id. at *3.
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troubled about the contact and had more than a vague sense of
105
shame.” In regard to John Doe 28A, the court concluded that
after the abuse, he (plaintiff) “felt that Father Liles had breached
106
their friendship and trust.” As further evidence, the court stated
that John Doe 28A “was upset, embarrassed and ashamed of the
107
sexual encounters.”
The court relied on Blackowiak for the rule that “one is injured
108
if one is sexually abused.” Accordingly, the court held that the
plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations because
they “knew or should have known that their injuries were caused by
109
sexual abuse six years prior to commencing litigation in 1997.”
The court’s reliance on the fact that John Doe 28A felt guilt
and shame at the time of the abuse as evidence that he knew he was
abused was misplaced. Guilt and shame are two of the very
emotions that the legislature recognized were experienced by
childhood abuse victims and that it was these emotions that made it
extremely difficult for victims to discover the connection between
110
the childhood sexual abuse and their resulting injuries.
Nonetheless, the court virtually disregarded the delayed discovery
statute and determined that the very emotional difficulties that
cause delayed discovery for abuse victims—difficulties that led to
the statute being enacted in the first place—somehow trigger the
111
immediate running of the statute.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at *2 (citing Blackowiak, 536 N.W.2d at 3).
109. Id. at *3-4. The evidence relating to John Doe 28A does not follow the
standard cited by the court that the evidence must be “review[ed] in the light most
favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted.” Id. at *2 (citing Fabio
v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993)). Viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to John Doe 28A would lead to the conclusion that he did not
begin to recognize the abuse until 1991, and did not even put a face to who
abused him until sometime after 1991. John Doe 28B, 2000 WL 781362, at *2.
Whether or not the court believes these facts are true does not bear on the
summary judgment motion. See Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3 (stating that the issue
of when the statute of limitations is triggered is generally a fact issue for the jury
unless there is overwhelming evidence). These facts are sufficient to raise a fact
question for the jury as to when John Doe 28A first realized that he was abused.
Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 243 (Minn. 1982) (stating that “[w]here
there are disputed questions of material fact as to whether a plaintiff is barred by a
statute of limitation, these questions are to be decided by a jury”).
110. See Bugge, 573 N.W.2d at 680 n.5 (generally citing Hearing on S.F. 315
Before the Criminal Law Div. of the Senate Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 17, 1989)).
111. See John Doe 28B, 2000 WL 781362, at *4.
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As evidenced by these four cases, there was still much
confusion in the application of the Minnesota delayed discovery
statute after Blackowiak and Bugge. Specifically, under Blackowiak, it
remained unclear whether a minor plaintiff could trigger the
statute of limitations before he or she reached the age of
112
majority. Also, if the statute of limitations did not begin to run
until majority, it was unclear whether the plaintiff had until age
113
twenty-four or twenty-five to bring a claim. Finally, it was unclear
whether the Blackowiak court and its progeny effectively had read
the causation and personal injury elements out of the delayed
114
discovery statute.
V. D.M.S. V. BARBER
A. Facts
115

D.M.S. was born on September 10, 1979.
In August or
September 1992, D.M.S. was placed in the home of Kennedy
Barber, a foster parent, by the Professional Association of
116
Treatment Homes (PATH). Barber was licensed as a foster-care
117
provider in October 1990 at the recommendation of PATH.
Thereafter, PATH was responsible for supervising and evaluating
Barber and making recommendations whether to grant or revoke
118
his foster-care license. On February 22, 1993, D.M.S. reported to
a social worker that Barber was acting suspiciously toward him and
119
other children. D.M.S. was removed from the Barber home that
120
day. Later, D.M.S. alleged that Barber had repeatedly sexually
121
abused him during the five months that he was in Barber’s care.
112. See Gibbons v. Krowech, No. C4-95-2435, 1996 WL 422513, at *2 (Minn.
Ct. App. July 30, 1996) (citing Blackowiak).
113. Compare Bugge, 573 N.W.2d at 681-82, and Bertram, 597 N.W.2d at 313-14,
with J.J., 578 N.W.2d at 21.
114. See Bugge, 573 N.W.2d at 681-82; Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3.
115. D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 385.
116. Id. PATH is a non-profit private agency licensed in Minnesota to provide
foster home placement for children unable to remain in their current living
situation. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. At least three other persons have pursued legal actions against Barber
and PATH for sexual abuse. D.M.S. v. Barber, 627 N.W.2d 369, 371 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2001).
120. Id.
121. D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 386.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003

15

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 4 [2003], Art. 4
FINNEGAN_F ORMATTED . DOC

1460

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

4/7/2003 11:09 AM

[Vol. 29:4

Specifically, D.M.S. alleged that Barber gave him uncomfortably
long hugs shortly after he arrived at Barber’s home and these
uncomfortable hugs led to kissing, fondling, and eventually oral
122
sex. D.M.S. stated that initially he felt like he was in a “daze” and
123
“didn’t understand it [the abuse].”
Over time he felt “used,”
“like a piece of meat or something” and often had a sick feeling in
124
his stomach and “just felt bad.”
On June 8, 1999, D.M.S. served PATH with a summons and
complaint, alleging that PATH was liable to D.M.S. under the
theories of respondeat superior, negligent hiring, negligent
retention, negligent supervision, negligent failure to investigate
and failure to act upon prior allegations of sexual misconduct
against Barber, and negligent placement of D.M.S. in Barber’s
125
care.
The district court granted PATH’s motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that D.M.S.’s negligence-based claims
were barred by the six-year statute of limitations contained in the
126
delayed discovery statute. The district court also held that the
delayed discovery statute did not apply to D.M.S.’s respondeat
superior claim and also that the two-year statute of limitations in
127
Minnesota Statute Section 541.07(1) (2000) barred this claim.
128
D.M.S. appealed.
B. Court of Appeals’ Decision
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to
129
dismiss D.M.S.’s claims based on the statute of limitations. In so
doing, the court reaffirmed Blackowiak’s conclusions that “one is
injured if one is sexually abused” and that “[t]he victim is
immediately put on notice of the causal connection between the
122. Id. D.M.S. also alleged that he had two additional sexual encounters with
Barber after he was removed from Barber’s home. Id. at 386 n.1. The additional
abuse allegedly occurred once in Barber’s car and once in Barber’s home, which
was still a PATH foster home at the time. D.M.S., 627 N.W.2d at 371. Both the
district court and the court of appeals held that PATH had no duty to protect
D.M.S. after he left PATH’s care on February 22, 1993. D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 386
n.1. The issue was not raised on appeal. Id.
123. Id. (citing D.M.S.’s deposition).
124. Id. (citing D.M.S.’s deposition).
125. Id. D.M.S. also named Barber in the complaint as well, but the claims
against Barber were not before the court on appeal. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.; see M INN. STAT. § 541.07(1) (2002).
128. D.M.S., 627 N.W.2d at 371.
129. Id.
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abuse and the injury so that the statute of limitations begins to run
130
once the victim is abused.”
The court stated that the D.M.S.
131
situation was “almost identical” to the situation in J.J. v. Luckow.
The J.J. court held that the plaintiff’s action was barred because he
failed to bring his claim within six years of the time at which he
132
realized that the perpetrator’s conduct was improper.
As in J.J., the court of appeals found that D.M.S. knew of the
133
abuse outside of the six-year statutory period. Accordingly, the
court held that the statute of limitations for D.M.S.’s claims began
134
to run when he became aware of the abuse, at age thirteen. The
court of appeals also concluded that D.M.S.’s claim of respondeat
135
superior was barred by a two-year statute of limitations. Here, the
court concluded that the statute of limitations for a claim of
respondeat superior is the same as the statute of limitations for the
136
underlying tort upon which the claim is based. In the case of
sexual abuse, the court determined that the underlying tort was an
intentional tort and therefore the statute of limitations for a claim
of respondeat superior, here, was the same as it is for an intentional
137
tort: two-years.
C. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Reversal of the Court of Appeals
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
and held that D.M.S.’s claims against PATH were timely under the
138
delayed discovery statute.
D.M.S. brought his action against
139
PATH when he was nineteen years old.
PATH argued that
because D.M.S. reported the abuse when he was thirteen, D.M.S.
140
necessarily knew at that point that he had been sexually abused.
Applying Blackowiak, PATH asserted that the statute of limitations
130. Id. at 373.
131. Id.
132. J.J., 578 N.W.2d at 20.
133. D.M.S., 627 N.W.2d at 374.
134. Id. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision that the
statute of limitations began to run for D.M.S.’s negligence claims on February 22,
1993, the day on which D.M.S. reported the abuse to a social worker. Id. at 373-74.
135. Id. at 374. The court based its decision on the conclusion that the claim
was based on an intentional tort, even though the court acknowledged that the
pertinent statute of limitations is the one attached to the underlying claim. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 389-91.
139. Id. at 390.
140. Id. at 387.
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on D.M.S.’s claims began to run when he was thirteen and were
141
time barred on D.M.S.’s nineteenth birthday.
The Minnesota
Supreme Court, however, concluded that “reading the delayed
discovery statute in this way would defeat its purpose and render
142
the statute meaningless for children.” The court held that
[a]s a matter of law, a reasonable child is incapable of
knowing that he or she has been sexually abused and,
absent some other disability that serves to delay the
running of the statute of limitations, the six-year period of
limitation under the delayed discovery statute begins
to
143
run when the victim reaches the age of majority.
In addition, the court held that the delayed discovery statute also
applied to the respondeat superior claim, because it was based on
the case of sexual abuse, which was governed by the delayed
144
discovery statute.
In reaching this conclusion, the court extensively discussed its
145
decisions in Bugge and Blackowiak.
The court reaffirmed
Blackowiak’s holding that “as a matter of law one is ‘injured’ if one is
sexually abused” and that the “ultimate question” posed by the
delayed discovery statute is “the time at which the complainant
146
knew or should have known that he/she was sexually abused.”
D.M.S. also reaffirmed Bugge’s holding that “this question is
answered by the application of the objective, reasonable person
147
standard.”
The court, however, recognized that it had
148
improperly applied the delayed discovery statute in Bugge. The
court held that the delayed discovery statute begins to run at age
eighteen, when the disability ends, not at age nineteen as the Bugge
149
court concluded.
Justices Stringer and Anderson both dissented, arguing for a
150
strict statutory interpretation of the delayed discovery statute.
They reasoned that because the delayed discovery statute explicitly
141. Id.
142. Id. at 390.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 391.
145. Id. at 387-93.
146. Id. at 387 (citing Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3).
147. Id. (citing Bugge, 573 N.W.2d at 681).
148. Id. at 389 n.5. In Bugge, the court concluded that based on M INN. STAT. §
541.073 (2000) and M INN. STAT. § 541.15(a) (2000), plaintiff had six years from
the date of her nineteenth birthday to commence her action. 573 N.W.2d at 682.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 391-93.
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states that Minnesota Statutes section 541.15(a) is unaffected by the
151
delayed discovery statute, D.M.S.’s claims were barred on his
152
nineteenth birthday.
D. Analysis of the D.M.S. Decision
The court in D.M.S. had the opportunity to follow the delayed
discovery statute’s clear language to establish the correct standard
for courts to apply when deciding a statute of limitations issue in a
case of childhood sexual abuse and to thereby overrule its previous
erroneous Blackowiak and Bugge decisions. Instead, the court
attempted to clarify that under the Blackowiak rule as a matter of
153
law a child is unable to recognize that he or she was abused. This
“clarification” strays even further from the language of the delayed
discovery statute. Moreover, the court’s affirmation of Blackowiak
effectively bars an opportunity at justice for many survivors who are
154
over the age of twenty-four. The court’s misguided analysis in
Blackowiak allows child abusers and those responsible for putting
child abusers in positions of authority to continue to hide behind
the statute of limitations when the clear language of the delayed
discovery statute demands that victims be given an opportunity to
show that they were unable to discover 1) the sexual abuse, 2) the
resulting injury, and 3) that the injury was caused by the sexual
155
abuse.
1. Narrow Holding Based On D.M.S. Facts
The narrow holding of D.M.S., that a survivor of childhood
sexual abuse has until at least age twenty-four to bring a claim, at
the very least, does not use the erroneous Blackowiak standard to
penalize survivors of sexual abuse who are under the age of twenty156
four.
Because Blackowiak held that one is injured if one is
sexually abused, survivors of childhood abuse who were under the
age of twenty-four were in danger of a court examining the facts
and determining that the child knew that he or she was abused
151. M INN. STAT. § 541.073(2)(d).
152. D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 391-93 (stating that the language of M INN. STAT. §
541.15(a) (2000) clearly states that in no case should the statute be tolled past the
plaintiff’s nineteenth birthday where the disability of minority is alleged).
153. Id. at 390.
154. See id. at 387.
155. Id.
156. See D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 390.
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before he or she turned the age of majority.
Under this
reasoning, the court of appeals in D.M.S held that the statute of
limitations began to run on D.M.S.’s claims when he was only
thirteen years old because D.M.S., at that age, reported the abuse
158
to a counselor and therefore knew he was abused. The supreme
court, however, held that “as a matter of law, a reasonable child is
159
incapable of knowing that he or she has been sexually abused.”
This holding may have resulted from a judicial recognition that
under the harsh Blackowiak standard the delayed discovery statute
160
would be almost meaningless for children.
This band-aid
approach, while beneficial to a small class of victims, continues to
ignore the root of the problem—the erroneous Blackowiak decision
itself.
Although the D.M.S. narrow holding prevents certain survivors
from being barred by the Blackowiak rule, like Blackowiak it is not
161
legally defensible. The delayed discovery statute does not either
expressly or impliedly state that the statute of limitations cannot
162
begin to run before the victim reaches the age of majority.
Rather, the statute plainly states that the statute of limitations
should begin to run when the “plaintiff knows or has reason to
163
know that his or her personal injury was caused by sexual abuse.”
In some cases this discovery could be at the time of the abuse. In
most cases, however, it is much later. Regardless, the statute should
164
be applied as it was written and intended.
2. Broad Holding Based Upon Blackowiak Standard
The tragic part of the D.M.S. decision is the broad holding, in
which the court reaffirmed its erroneous statutory construction in
165
Blackowiak.
The D.M.S. court stated that in Blackowiak, “[w]e
observed that ‘as a matter of law one is ‘injured’ if one is sexually
157.
*2.
158.
159.
160.
161.
(2002).
162.
163.
164.
Duluth
1985).
165.

See D.M.S., 627 N.W.2d at 374; Gibbons v. Krowech, 1996 WL 422513, at
D.M.S., 627 N.W.2d at 374.
D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 390.
See id.
Compare D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 390, with M INN. STAT. § 541.073 subd. 2(a)
See § 541.073.
Id.
See Am. Tower, L.P., v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn. 2001);
Fireman’s Relief Ass’n v. City of Duluth, 361 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn.
D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 389.
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abused,’ and stated that the ‘ultimate question’ posed by the
delayed discovery statute is the ‘time at which the complainant
166
knew or should have known that he/she was sexually abused.’”
This insistence on affirming Blackowiak is problematic for
167
numerous reasons. First, Blackowiak relied on Fireman’s Fund, a
168
vastly different case. The Fireman’s Fund situation appears similar
to that in Blackowiak because both involved the sexual abuse of
169
children. These cases, however, examined vastly different legal
questions. The Fireman’s Fund court solely examined whether a
sexual molester could avoid the intentional acts exclusion in a
liability insurance policy and thus receive coverage for the damages
170
resulting from his sexual abuse. That decision did not examine
the injury that the victim suffered, the time at which the victim
realized that he was abused, the time at which the victim discovered
that his injuries were caused by the childhood sexual abuse, or any
171
other issue pertinent to the delayed discovery statute. On the
other hand, the issue before the Blackowiak court was the time at
which the victim, not the perpetrator, realized that the injury was
172
caused by the childhood sexual abuse.
The delayed discovery
statute does not involve any inquiry into the perpetrator’s intent to
173
injure.
The second problem with the Blackowiak standard is that it
clearly does not comport with the unambiguous language of the
174
delayed discovery statute. The issue under the delayed discovery
statute is not when the victim was abused or even when the victim
was injured. Rather, the issue is when the plaintiff knew or had
reason to know that he or she was 1) sexually abused, 2) personally
175
injured, and 3) that the injury was caused by the sexual abuse.
The majority in Blackowiak, and subsequently in Bugge and D.M.S, at
a minimum disregarded the first and third elements of the delayed
discovery statute, personal injury and causation, narrowing the
statute such that the only requirement is knowledge of the sexual
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 387,
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Hill, 314 N.W.2d 834, 834-835 (Minn. 1982).
See Blackowiak, 546 N.W2d at 3.
See id. at 2; Fireman’s Fund, 314 N.W.2d at 834.
Fireman’s Fund, 314 N.W.2d at 834-35.
Id.
Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 2-3.
See M INN. STAT. § 541.073 (2002).
Compare M INN. STAT. § 541.073 subd. 2(a), with Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at

175.

See Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 4 (Gardebring, J., dissenting).

3.
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176

abuse.
However, as Justice Gardebring noted, “[k]nowledge that
sexual abuse occurred or even knowledge of the other prerequisite,
personal injury . . . is not central; it is the link between them, the
causation, one of the other, which must be considered in order to
177
determine whether a lawsuit is within the limitations period.” In
D.M.S., however, the court cited Blackowiak for the ultimate inquiry
regarding the statute of limitations under the delayed discovery
statute: when is “the time at which the complainant knew or should
178
have known that he/she was sexually abused.”
This standard
makes no inquiry whatsoever into either the explicit causation
element or the explicit knowledge of personal injury element of
179
the delayed discovery statute.
The Minnesota Legislature explicitly mandated that “when
words of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear
and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be
180
disregarded.” Further, the Minnesota Supreme Court itself has
long declared that “a statute is to be construed, if possible, so that
no word, phrase, or sentence is superfluous, void, or
181
insignificant.” The Blackowiak court, and by extension the Bugge
and D.M.S. courts, did not follow either the legislature’s clear
cannons of statutory construction or even its own precedent that
every word in a statute should be given meaning in
182
interpretation. Rather, the court took on the role of legislator by
judicially amending the clear language of the delayed discovery
statute from “knew or had reason to know that the injury was
caused by the sexual abuse” to “knew or should have known that
183
he/she was sexually abused.”
The third reason that the Blackowiak standard is problematic is
that it is built on the assumption that “concepts of sexual abuse and
injury within the meaning of the [delayed discovery] statute are
176. See Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3 (holding that “while the manifestation and
form of the injury is significant to the victim, it is simply not relevant to the
ultimate question of the time at which the complainant knew or should have
known that he/she was sexually abused”); Bugge, 573 N.W.2d at 681-82 (citing
Blackowiak); D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 387 (citing Blackowiak).
177. Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 4.
178. D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 387 (citing Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3).
179. See id.
180. M INN. STAT. § 645.16 (2001).
181. Duluth Fireman’s, 361 N.W.2d at 385.
182. Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3.
183. Compare Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3, with M INN. STAT § 541.073 subd. 2.
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184

essentially one and the same, not separable.”
Although it is a
reasonable assertion that on some level every victim of sexual abuse
185
is injured at some point, the sexual abuse and the injury are still
186
separable. The abuse occurs at specific times, locations, and in a
certain manner. However, the injury can take on vastly different
forms and can manifest itself at different times throughout the
victim’s life. Often, these victims will not even know until years
later that the injury they are experiencing is related to the sexual
187
abuse they suffered years before.
This assumption of the injury and the sexual abuse being nonseparable also implies that all victims are immediately injured [for
188
purposes of the delayed discovery statute]. This inference is not
reasonable for two reasons. First, the legislative intent behind the
delayed discovery statute clearly recognized that “repressed
memory, denial, shame, and other similar factors may prevent
sexual abuse victims from coming forward with actions against their
189
alleged abusers in a timely fashion.”
This intent clearly
recognizes that the injury is not immediate. Second, the inference
is not reasonable in light of the reality that victims of childhood
sexual abuse often do not experience the injury until years later or
more often are not able to associate the injury with its cause, the
190
childhood sexual abuse, until years later.
The fourth reason the D.M.S. court’s approval of Blackowiak is
problematic is because it violates the spirit behind the delayed
discovery statute. The legislature created the delayed discovery

184. See Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3.
185. See REINERT, supra note 11, at 36-37, 52; see also M UFSON ET AL., supra note
20, at 75 (listing various effects of sexual abuse); REIN, supra note 6, at 71-72
(discussing various studies which examined effects of childhood sexual abuse);
KRITSBERG, supra note 22, at 56-57 (listing secondary effects of sexual abuse).
186. See Shirley v. Reif, 920 P.2d 405, 413-14 (Kan. 1996) (holding that
knowledge of sexual abuse alone is not enough without discovery that the abuse
was the cause of the victim’s injuries).
187. See HYDE & FORSYTH, supra note 8, at 47 (noting that often times victims of
childhood sexual abuse do not manifest any injury until later in adulthood); see
also HUNTER, supra note 12, at 59.
188. See D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 389 (stating that in Blackowiak “we said nothing
more than . . . the victim is immediately put on notice of the causal connection
between the abuse and the injury”).
189. See Bugge, 573 N.W.2d at 680 n.5 (generally citing Hearing on S.F. 315
Before the Criminal Law Div. of the Senate Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 17, 1989)).
190. See generally HYDE & FORSYTH, supra note 8, at 47 (stating that
“[s]ometimes there are no symptoms [of childhood sexual abuse] until later in
life”); see also HUNTER, supra note 12, at 59.
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statute in recognition that victims of sexual abuse should be given a
unique statute of limitations that would allow for recovery years
191
after the abuse occurred. The “purpose of the original bill was to
amend the statute of limitations for sexual abuse cases so that it
would begin to run (1) when the abuse was committed, or (2) at
the time the victim knew or had reason to know he or she was
192
injured by the sexual abuse.” Tragically, the Blackowiak standard
only supports the first portion of the legislature’s purpose and does
not allow the victim the benefit of the clear statutory mandate that
the statute of limitations only begins to run when the victim had
193
reason to know that the abuse caused the injury.
Had the
legislature intended the statute of limitations to run when the
abuse occurred there would have been no reason to include the
second purpose and virtually no reason to enact the statute at all.
D.M.S.’s approval of Blackowiak is also problematic because
Blackowiak has consistently been cited as support to begin the
statute of limitations whenever the victim feels shame and guilt
194
about the abuse. However, as Justice Gardebring pointed out,
“[s]hame is not the same as knowledge that sexual abuse caused
195
injury.”
The very nature of childhood sexual abuse makes
survivors feel shameful and confused about what happened to
196
them.
Shame and guilt are feelings of personal fault, not
victimization. These feelings cause victims to not understand that
they have been abused, and thus fail to report the abuse. Further,
these feelings generally arise at the time of the abuse itself,
meaning that there almost always would be some indication that
the survivor had been abused, triggering the statute of limitations
191. See M INN. STAT. § 541.073; see also Bugge, 573 N.W.2d at 680 n.5 (generally
citing Hearing on S.F. 315 Before the Criminal Law Div. of the Senate Judiciary
Comm. (Feb. 17, 1989) as recognition that “repressed memory, denial, shame, and
other similar factors may prevent sexual abuse victims from coming forward with
actions against their alleged abusers in a timely fashion”).
192. Greenwood Brown, supra note 39, at 421 (citing Tape of Legislative
Proceedings, Criminal Justice Div. of the House Judiciary Comm. of the Minn.
House of Representatives, H.F. No. 461 (Feb. 28, 1989)).
193. See Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3.
194. See J.J. v. Luckow, 578 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998); see also Doe
28B v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis, No. C9-99-2164, 2000 WL 781362,
at *3-4 (Minn. Ct. App. June 20, 2000); Gibbons v. Krowech, No. C4-95-2435, 1996
WL 422513, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. July 30, 1996).
195. Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 4.
196. See Ross v. Garabedian, 742 N.E.2d 1046, 1050 (Mass. 2001) (holding that
knowledge of wrongfulness and the feeling of shame were not sufficient to trigger
the delayed discovery statute).
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197

under Blackowiak.
Additionally, the coping mechanisms that
many of these survivors implement to combat the feelings of shame
and guilt and the many other effects of childhood sexual abuse are
the very mechanisms which prevent the survivors from being able
198
to realize the cause of their injuries. Survivors often deny that
the abuse ever happened, are unable to connect the source of their
injuries to the abuse, repress the abuse, or simply do not allow
199
themselves to feel the painful psychological effects of the abuse.
Often, it is not until years later that many survivors are able to
stabilize their lives and uncover the effects of their childhood
sexual abuse through the painful process of breaking their coping
200
mechanisms.
None of these realities are recognized in
201
Blackowiak. Essentially, the Blackowiak standard takes some of the
very reasons that the legislature enacted the delayed discovery
statute—survivors often deny that they were abused and feel
202
shameful—to trigger the statute of limitations.
197. See HANCOCK & MAINS, supra note 14, at 32 (recognizing that the theme of
guilt shows up often in survivors’ lives and is often carried with the survivors).
198. See KRITSBERG, supra note 22, at 48, 56-57 (describing the coping
mechanisms employed by many survivors of childhood sexual abuse and how these
mechanisms affect the survivors’ lives).
199. See Hearndon v. Graham, 767 So.2d 1179, 1183 (Fla. 2000) (recognizing
that many victims of sexual abuse “develop amnesia because of the horrible nature
of the abuse”); Hollmann v. Corcoran, 949 P.2d 386, 392 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997)
(stating that the Washington Legislature explicitly enacted the delayed discovery
statute in recognition of possible memory repression, sexual abuse victims’
difficulty in understanding the causal connection between the abuse and the
injury, and the fact that victims will often suffer more serious injuries many years
after the first recognition of the causal connection).
200. See generally HYDE & FORSYTH, supra note 8, at 47 (stating that
“[s]ometimes there are no symptoms [of childhood sexual abuse] until later in
life”).
201. A common argument for a harsh standard is that without it there would
be a “flood of litigation.” See, e.g., S.E. v. Shattuck-St. Mary’s School, 533 N.W.2d
628, 632 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that “to avoid a flood of claims there
must be a reasonable and definitive standard” for claims of childhood sexual
abuse under the delayed discovery statute). Even if there were additional claims
this policy is weak because “[i]t is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that
deserve it, even at the expense of a ‘flood of litigation,’ and it is a pitiful
confession of incompetence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief on
such grounds.” W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 12, at 56 (5th ed. 1984) (basing statement on potential flood of emotional
distress claims).
202. See Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3; Greenwood Brown, supra note 39, at 421
(citing Tape of Legislative Proceedings, Criminal Justice Div. of the House
Judiciary Comm. of the Minn. House of Representatives, H.F. No. 461 (Feb. 28,
1989)).
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E. Effects of the D.M.S. Decision
1. Survivors Under Age Twenty-Four
The main effect of the D.M.S. decision is that there is now no
question that, under the current Minnesota law, survivors of
childhood sexual abuse have until at least age twenty-four to bring
203
a claim based upon that abuse.
2. Survivors Over Twenty-Four
The D.M.S. court was not confronted with the situation where
204
the plaintiff was over twenty-four years of age.
However, the
court does approvingly cite Blackowiak’s rewriting of the statute for
the proposition that the delayed discovery statute begins to run
when the victim knows or reasonably should have known that he or
205
she was abused. Under this interpretation, victims of childhood
sexual abuse who are over age twenty-four have little chance of
prevailing over the statute of limitations in order to get to the
merits of their claim unless he/she can prove some mental
206
disability that prevented recognition of the abuse.
A mental
207
disability that would apparently suffice is memory repression.
Another theory that should overcome the Blackowiak rule is the
victim’s delayed discovery that he or she was a victim and that what
occurred was the perpetrator’s or entity’s fault and not the victim’s
208
fault.
203. D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 390.
204. See id. at 383-93.
205. See id. at 387.
206. See, e.g., Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 1-3; Bugge, 573 N.W.2d at 677-82.
207. See D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 389. D.M.S. did not affect the Minnesota
common law rule that memory repression is a mental disability that tolls the
statute of limitations. See Bugge, 573 N.W.2d at 681 (stating that memory
repression would toll the statute of limitations); Bertram, 597 N.W.2d at 312-14
(remanding case for determination of whether the plaintiffs suffered from
repressed memory syndrome). The D.M.S. court did not explicitly discuss the
issue of memory repression, but the court did cite Bugge for the proposition that
“the statute of limitations begins to run once a victim is abused unless there is
some legal disability, such as the victim’s age, or mental disability, such as
repressed memory of the abuse.” D.M.S., 645 N.W.2d at 389. This clearly states
that the court would recognize memory repression as a mental disability that
would toll the statute of limitations. See id.
208. See id.; Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3. Because the court erroneously
focuses on the victim’s personal feelings of fault—shame and guilt—it is unlikely
that the court would recognize these feelings are actually signs that should serve to

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss4/4

26

Finnegan: The Judicial Misapplication of the Minnesota Delayed Discovery St
FINNEGAN_F ORMATTED . DOC

4/7/2003 11:09 AM

2003] MISAPPLICATION OF DELAYED DISCOVERY STATUTE

1471

3. Entities’ Negligence and Fraudulent Concealment When
Survivor Had No Previous Knowledge
a. Negligence
Even though many victims of clergy abuse did not know until
recently that church officials often had knowledge of certain
perpetrators’ dangerous propensities toward children before the
victims were abused, the delayed discovery statute continues to bar
209
many meritorious claims.
The statute states that it applies to
actions against “a person who . . . negligently permit[s] sexual
210
abuse against the plaintiff to occur.”
This part of the delayed
discovery statute combined with the judicially-made Blackowiak rule
means that as soon as a victim of sexual abuse had reason to know
that he or she was abused, the victim somehow should also have
211
known that church officials were responsible.
However, it is
unreasonable to put victims on such notice. As unthinkable as it
was until recently that a significant number of priests abused
children, it was even more unfathomable that church leaders
knowingly moved the dangerous priests around and allowed them
to have further opportunities to abuse children. It is absurd to
charge survivors, when they do discover that they were abused, with
the knowledge that an entity, such as the church, was negligent
when almost no one in our society would have believed or would
have had reason to believe that certain church officials were
212
responsible prior to six months ago.
b. Fraudulent Concealment
A claim of fraudulent concealment should toll the delayed
discovery statute. The only purpose of fraudulent concealment is

toll the Blackowiak rule because the victim has not truly realized that he or she was
abused.
209. See M INN. STAT. § 541.073 (3) (2002).
210. Id.
211. See id.; Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3.
212. It is arguable that if a victim knew all three elements of the delayed
discovery statute (injury, abuse, and causation), that he or she could have sued
based on the employment of the perpetrator (respondeat superior) and found out
through discovery what the church officials knew. However, this argument places
too great of a burden on a victim, most of whom did not think any higher ranking
church officials were at fault and would thus not have been inclined to sue the
church officials.
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to prevent a victim from realizing either that they have been
injured or who caused that injury. Although the fraudulent
concealment did not cause the injury (though it may aggravate the
injury) because the abuse had already occurred, it is an intentional
effort to prevent a victim from realizing that an entity was a cause
of the injury. Those responsible for the concealment should not
then be allowed to hide behind a statute of limitations after their
active concealment made it practically impossible for a victim to
seek justice against this entity before the statute of limitations ran.
This is the very reason that the Minnesota Supreme Court applied
213
the rule in the first place. The court concluded:
[O]ne who cannot assert his right because the necessary
knowledge is improperly kept from him is not within the
mischief the statute was intended to remedy; but is within
the spirit of the law that restrains its operation. . . . Fraud
is bad, it should not be permitted to go unchecked
anywhere,214and justice should always be able to penetrate
its armor.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has apparently not addressed
the specific issues of whether the delayed discovery statute of
limitations applies to a claim of fraudulent concealment or what, if
215
any, statute of limitations does apply to these claims. The court
did, however, deal with fraudulent concealment in a similar
216
situation in Wild v. Rarig. Here, the plaintiff alleged that he did
not know that defamatory material had been published about him
217
because of fraudulent concealment.
The court held that
218
fraudulent concealment would toll the statute of limitations. The
court indicated that although there “is no categorical definition of
what constitutes fraudulent concealment,” the doctrine generally
would apply where there is a concealment that is fraudulent or
intentional and a fiduciary relationship exists between the
219
parties. In the cases now coming to light, we know that not all of
213. Schmucking v. Mayo, 183 Minn. 37, 40, 235 N.W. 633, 634 (1931).
214. Id. at 40-41, 235 N.W. at 634.
215. See D.M.S. v. Barber, 645 N.W.2d 383, 383-93 (Minn. 2002); W.J.L. v.
Bugge, 573 N.W.2d 677, 677-84 (Minn. 1998); Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 1-5.
216. 302 Minn. 419, 450, 234 N.W.2d 775, 795 (Minn. 1975) (holding that
there was a fact question about whether the defendant fraudulently concealed a
defamatory publication and concluding that fraudulent concealment would toll
the statute of limitations).
217. Id. at 448, 234 N.W.2d at 793.
218. Id. at 450, 234 N.W.2d at 795.
219. See id. (citing 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 206f, for the proposition
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the concealment of the church officials’ knowledge was due to
simple negligence. More often the church officials made a
concerted effort to conceal that they had any idea that a specific
priest or brother was dangerous prior to the abuse. The
relationship between church priests and parishioners of the church
is “as clearly fiduciary as any relationship between two individuals in
our society. To hold otherwise would deny the morality and the
220
purpose of religious institutions.”
VI. OTHER STATES’ TREATMENT OF CIVIL CLAIMS FOR
CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE
221

In addition to Minnesota, nineteen states have enacted
causation-focused delayed discovery statutes, under which the
limitations period begins to run when the survivor realizes that his
222
or her injuries were caused by childhood sexual abuse. Other
states have enacted non-causation delayed discovery statutes, where
the limitations period starts on the discovery of an event other than
223
causation.
Some states have enacted statutes that run for a
specific number of years after a plaintiff reaches the age of
224
majority. Hawaii has recognized a common law delayed discovery
that fraudulent concealment consists of a concealment that is fraudulent or
intentional between fiduciaries).
220. Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn et al., 705 N.Y.S.2d 661,
668 (App. Div. 2000) (Miller, J., concurring and dissenting).
221. See M INN. STAT. § 541.073 (2002).
222. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.140 subd. b1-2 (Michie 2001); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 340.1 (2002); FLA. STAT. ch. 95.11 (7) (2002); ILL . COMP. STAT. ch. 735 §
5/13-202.2 (2002); IOWA CODE § 614.8A (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-523 (2002);
M ASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 260, § 4C (2002); M INN. STAT. § 541.073; M O. REV. STAT. §
537.046 (2002); M ONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-216 (2002); NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.215
(2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4 (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:61B-1 (2002);
OR. REV. STAT. § 12.117 (2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-51 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 26-10-25 (Michie 2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 522 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-249 (Michie 2002); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.340 (2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
893.587 (2002).
223. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-130 (Michie 2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.249
(Banks-Baldwin 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-30 (Michie 2002); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 15-3-40, 15-3-35 (Law. Co-op. 2002) & § 15-3-535 (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7812-25.1 (2)(a)-(b) (2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-3-105 (b)(i-ii) (Michie 2002).
224. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-103.7 (1) (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577d
(2002); D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-301 & § 12-302 (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-33.1 (b)
(2002); IDAHO CODE § 6-1704 (2002); IND. CODE § 34-11-2-4, § 34-11-6-1 (2002); LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3496.1 (2002); M D. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-201
(2002); M I. COMP. LAWS § 600.5805 (9) (2002) & § 600.5851 (1) (2002); M ISS.
CODE ANN. § 15-1-49 (2002) & § 15-1-59 (2002); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 208 (McKinney
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225

rule. Maine enacted a statute for survivors of sexual abuse that
states that “[a]ctions based upon sexual acts toward minors may be
226
commenced at any time.”
Finally, there are some states that
unfortunately do not treat childhood sexual abuse any different
than other wrongful acts or omissions for statute of limitation
227
purposes.
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court effectively
disregarded the explicit causation and personal knowledge of
injury elements in the Minnesota delayed discovery statute in
Blackowiak, Bugge, and D.M.S., courts from other states have
228
correctly applied a causation delayed discovery statute. Werre v.
David represents a particularly insightful examination of such a
229
statute. In Werre, the Montana Supreme Court interpreted the
state’s delayed discovery statute, which states that a plaintiff must
bring a claim based upon the childhood sexual abuse “3 years after
the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that
230
the injury was caused by the act of childhood sexual abuse.” The
plaintiff alleged that her stepfather sexually abused her when she
2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-17 (a) (2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18 (2002) & §
28-01-25 (2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (2002) & § 2305.16 (2002);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 95 & 12 § 96 (2002); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5524 (2002) & §
5533 (2002); W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12 (2002) & §55-2-15 (2002).
225. See Dunlea v. Dappen, 924 P.2d 196, 204 (Haw. 1996) (establishing
delayed discovery doctrine in Hawaii).
226. M E . REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752-C (West 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 281-106, 28-3-104 (2002) (allowing one year for personal injury actions and tolling
until age of majority); TEX . CIV. PRAC. & REM. §§ 16.001, 16.003, 16.0045 (Vernon
2002).
227. ALA. CODE § 6-2-38 (l) (2002); DEL . CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 8119 (2001).
228. See Dunlea, 924 P.2d at 204 (holding that it is a fact question of whether a
victim of childhood sexual abuse ascertained “her injuries and their causal link”);
Shirley v. Reif, 920 P.2d 405, 413-14 (Kan. 1996)(holding that the jury should
decide whether a victim of childhood sexual abuse’s claim is brought within three
years of discovering that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the childhood
sexual abuse); Ross v. Garabedian, 742 N.E.2d 1046, 1049 (Mass. 2001)
(concluding in a childhood sexual abuse case that the court will not grant
summary judgment when it is “unclear whether, and to what extent, a plaintiff
perceived a ‘causal connection’ between a defendant’s misconduct and the
plaintiff’s alleged psychological harm”); Hollmann v. Corcoran, 949 P.2d 386, 392
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that “[t]he statute of limitations is tolled until the
victim of childhood sexual abuse in fact discovers the causal connection between
the defendant’s act and the injuries for which the claim is brought”).
229. 913 P.2d 625, 630 (Mont. 1996) (holding that where there is conflicting
evidence as to the time at which a victim of childhood sexual abuse knew of the
causal connection between her injuries and the sexual abuse, the decision should
be left to a jury).
230. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss4/4

30

Finnegan: The Judicial Misapplication of the Minnesota Delayed Discovery St
FINNEGAN_F ORMATTED . DOC

4/7/2003 11:09 AM

2003] MISAPPLICATION OF DELAYED DISCOVERY STATUTE

1475

231

was approximately twelve to fourteen years old. The court noted
that there was conflicting evidence with regard to whether the
plaintiff had or had not discovered the causal connection between
the abuse and her injuries within three years of filing the
232
complaint.
Specifically, the plaintiff testified that more than
three years before she brought suit she did not tell a male therapist
about the sexual abuse because she distrusted men as a result of the
233
abuse.
The plaintiff also testified that more than three years
before she brought suit, when she first saw a different therapist, she
made some connection between her need for counseling and her
234
childhood sexual abuse.
However, the court noted that the
plaintiff testified she did not connect her sexual abuse with her
psychological problems until within three years of commencing
235
suit.
Further, a doctor testified that when he saw the plaintiff
within three years of commencement of the suit, the plaintiff was
236
still in the process of connecting the harm to the sexual abuse.
Accordingly, the court concluded that there were “substantial
conflicts in the evidence regarding when [the plaintiff] discovered
that her injuries were caused by the childhood sexual abuse she
237
experienced.” The court held that this evidentiary conflict was a
fact question for the jury and not appropriate for summary
238
judgment.
The Werre decision is an insightful model for other courts
applying a delayed discovery statute for at least two reasons. First,
the court correctly applied the plain language of the delayed
discovery statute. The court held to the specific words that the
legislature enacted: discovery “that the injury was caused by the act
239
of childhood sexual abuse.” The court did not arbitrarily decide
240
that some of the words in the statute were unnecessary. Second,
the court did not make decisions about the merits of either party’s
231. Id. at 629. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that while her mother took
the other children out for ice cream, the plaintiff’s stepfather gave her “sex
education,” which included sexual intercourse. Id. She also alleged that after the
incident, her stepfather fondled her on several occasions. Id.
232. Id. at 630.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. (emphasis added).
240. Id.
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241

evidence. Rather, the court correctly viewed the evidence in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party and recognized that
genuine issues of material fact existed, which precluded summary
242
judgment. As a result, the court properly did not decide the case
in favor of the plaintiff or defendant, but simply determined that
the plaintiff had offered sufficient evidence to warrant that the case
243
be presented to a jury.
VII. MOVEMENT TO ALLOW SURVIVORS OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL
ABUSE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR RECOURSE
As the church sex abuse scandal continues to unfold in the
media around the country, both Connecticut and California have
amended their civil statutes of limitations for survivors of childhood
sexual abuse. Also, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania and Washington all have bills under consideration
that would change their statutes of limitation for claims of
244
childhood sexual abuse.
Both the Connecticut and California
statutes serve as good examples for other states concerned about
re-victimizing survivors of childhood sexual abuse through a harsh
statute of limitations, while recognizing the unique problems that
victims of childhood sexual abuse have in timely bringing their
abuse to justice.
A. Connecticut
The Connecticut statute of limitation for survivors of
childhood sexual abuse was amended, effective May 23, 2002, to
state: “no action . . . caused by sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or
sexual assault may be brought by such person later than thirty years

241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See id.
244. S.B. 1286, 46th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2003); H.B. 2457, 46th Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2003); H.B. 1321, 105th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2003);S.B. 1035, 93d
Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2003); S.B. 893, 93d Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2003); S.B. 51, Reg. Sess.
(Ken. 2003); S.B. 68, 417th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2003); H.B. 165, 417th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2003); S.B. 575, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2003);
H.B. 386, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2003); S.B. 669, 92d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Mo. 2003); H.B. 707, 158th Gen. Ct., 1st Year (N.H. 2003); S.B. 1421, 210th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2002); A.B. 5673, 226th Leg. (N.Y. 2003); S.B. 212, 185th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Penn. 2002); H.B. 1040, 58th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2003).
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245

from the date such person attains the age of majority.”
This
means that a survivor of sexual abuse has until age forty-eight to
246
bring an action based upon childhood sexual abuse.
One
objective of this statute is to “afford a plaintiff sufficient time to
recall and come to terms with traumatic childhood events before
247
he or she must take action.”
The Connecticut Legislature
recognized that “minor victims of sexual assault often do not
understand or recognize the damage which they have sustained
until a substantial number of years after they attain majority. In
fact, it is not just two or three years, but can be substantially longer
248
than that.”
This statute serves two important public policies. First, it
allows the survivors of sexual abuse ample time to recognize the
effects of the abuse and its causal relationship, to break through
the defense mechanisms that the survivor has employed to battle
the effects of the abuse, and to gain the strength to take the
courageous step of bringing an action against the perpetrator or
249
entities responsible.
Second, the thirty-year period provides a
bright line rule for the courts to apply. Thus, courts will simply
have to assess whether the plaintiff filed his or her claim before he
or she reached the age of forty-eight. This promotes judicial
efficiency and allows courts to focus more on the merits of the
alleged claims rather than on procedural issues.
B. California
In recognition of the ongoing sexual abuse scandal involving
the clergy, the California Legislature, on July 11, 2002, amended its
statute of limitation for actions based upon childhood sexual
250
abuse. The legislature responded to growing confirmations that
245. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577d (2002) (amending the number of years for
personal injury resulting from childhood abuse from seventeen years to thirty
years).
246. Id.
247. Roberts v. Caton, 619 A.2d 844, 849 (1993) (basing statement on the
prior amendment to CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577d, which extended the statute of
limitations from seven to seventeen years).
248. See id. at 849 n.8 (quoting Senator Anthony V. Avallone’s commentary
before the Senate regarding the proposal to amend the statute of limitations for
victims of childhood sexual abuse); see also HUNTER, supra note 12, at 59.
249. See generally Roberts, 619 A.2d at 849 (recognizing the legislative intent
behind the previous expansion of the statute of limitations for actions based upon
childhood sexual abuse).
250. S.B. 1779, 2001-02 Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2002). California Rule of Civil
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church leaders and officials knowingly moved priests who were
suspected of molesting children to other parishes where the priests
still had unrestricted access to children, some of whom were
abused by those very same priests. The prior statute stated that an
action against any entity for a negligent act could not be
251
commenced after the plaintiff’s twenty-sixth birthday.
The
amendment provided that the statute of limitation would not bar a
claim of personal injury by a survivor of sexual abuse, if brought
within one year of January 1, 2003, against a
[p]erson or entity [who] knew or had reason to know, or
was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct
by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and
failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement
reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual
conduct in the future by that person, including, but not
limited to, preventing or avoiding placement of that
person in a function or environment in which contact
with children is an inherent part of that function or
environment in which contact with children is an inherent
part of that function or environment. For purposes of this
subdivision, providing or requiring counseling is not
sufficient, in and of itself,
to constitute a reasonable step
252
or reasonable safeguard.
This is a major development in the area of delayed discovery
for two reasons. First, it gives current survivors of childhood sexual
abuse a chance for justice against an entity free of the re-victimizing
constraints of a harsh statute of limitations if that entity had control
over the perpetrator and knew or should have known or was
otherwise on notice of the perpetrator’s past unlawful sexual
253
conduct. Second, the statute provides clear guidelines for courts
254
to apply. The statute explicitly includes many different types of
agency relationships and explicitly provides that counseling of the
perpetrator alone is not in itself a reasonable safeguard against
255
childhood sexual abuse. This is important because it decreases
Procedure section 340.1 previously stated that a victim of childhood sexual abuse
had either eight years after reaching majority or three years after the plaintiff
realized that the personal injury was caused by the childhood sexual abuse. CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (2002).
251. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1(b)(2) (2002).
252. S.B. 1779, 2001-02 Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2002).
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See id.
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the possibility of judicial misinterpretation of the statute, thus
making it straightforward for the courts to administer.
In passing the amendment, the legislature recognized that
many of the survivors of childhood abuse by priests had no idea
until recently of church officials’ negligence and fraudulent
concealment of the abuse and thus had no idea that they had a
cause of action against these church officials. Many statutes of
limitation, including the previous California rule and possibly the
current Minnesota statute, effectively bar many of these negligence
claims against the church, even though until the recent clergy
abuse scandal became public, most of the survivors never had any
256
idea that the church was even negligent.
VIII. CONCLUSION: WHAT CAN BE DONE?
A. Courts
There are numerous things within the power of the courts that
can be done to address the current child sexual abuse scandal in
the church and to deter child abuse in the future. First, the courts
can apply the delayed discovery rule or applicable statute correctly.
This means that if the delayed discovery statute or rule of that state
mandates that it is the causal connection that triggers the statute of
limitation, the court should apply this standard. Specifically, for
the Minnesota Supreme Court this means that it should overrule its
clearly erroneous decision in Blackowiak. Second, courts should
properly apply summary judgment standards and view evidence
relating to when the survivor made the causal connection between
the abuse and the injury in the light most favorable to the survivor.
This would allow the fact question to be decided where it is
supposed to be decided—with the jury. Third, courts should allow
plaintiffs to make an offer of proof that an entity was negligent
without the plaintiff’s knowledge and/or an offer of proof that the
cause of action was fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff, to
establish a factual question for determination by the jury. Finally,
courts in states having a delayed discovery statute should ascertain
the clear legislative intent behind the delayed discovery statute and
interpret any construed ambiguities in the pertinent delayed
discovery statute to effectuate that intent.
256.

See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (2002); M INN. STAT. § 541.073 (2002).
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B. Legislatures
In addition to courts, legislatures clearly need to respond to
the ongoing church sexual abuse scandal, the greater realization
that childhood sexual abuse has profound effects on its victims, and
recognize the alarming prevalence of all child sex abuse, not just
that involving clergy. First, legislatures should examine or reexamine the policies behind allowing a survivor of sexual abuse an
extended statute of limitation. When enacting or amending a
statute dealing with childhood sexual abuse, legislatures must
clearly express that its intentions are clear in the statute to limit the
amount of “judicial interpretation” that is done. Legislatures
should also consider enacting or amending statutes in a manner
similar to the Connecticut and/or California models. Connecticut
provides a bright line rule that is easy for judges to apply.
California provides a clear response to the church abuse scandal.
C. Public
The public has the opportunity to aid in the healing process of
the survivors of childhood sexual abuse and encourage legislation
to protect children. As difficult as it may be to confront the issue,
the public should educate itself about the prevalence and effects of
sexual abuse. More importantly, the public must stand side by side
with survivors of sexual abuse and show their belief in, their
support for, and a willingness to fight the issue with, those
survivors.
The public should also inform their legislators that they are
outraged over child sexual abuse and feel that the laws should be
changed to reflect the heinousness and lasting damage of the crime
as well as the vital importance of deterring child sexual abuse in the
future.
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